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Abstract Perceptions are externally-directed—they present us with a mind-inde-
pendent reality, and thus contribute to our abilities to think about this reality, and to
know what is objectively the case. But perceptions are also internally-dependent—
their phenomenologies depend on the neuro-computational properties of the subject.
A good theory of perception must account for both these facts. But naive realism has
been criticized for failing to accommodate internal-dependence. This paper evalu-
ates and responds to this criticism. It first argues that a certain version of naive
realism, often called ‘‘selectionism’’, does indeed struggle with internal-depen-
dence. It then develops an alternate version of naive realism which does not. This
alternate version, inspired by an idea of Martin’s, accommodates the internal-de-
pendence of perceptions by recognizing the role that the subject’s neuro-compu-
tational properties play in shaping perceptual phenomenology. At the same time, it
retains the distinctive naive realist account of the external-directedness of
perceptions.
Keywords Naive realism  Disjunctivism  Perception  Phenomenology 
Phenomenal character  Neuro-computational properties
1 Introduction
Perceptions combine two interesting features. On the one hand, they present us with
mind-independent items, and thus contribute to our abilities to think about those
items, and to know what is objectively the case. Following Pautz (2010), we may
call this the ‘‘external-directedness’’ of perceptions. On the other hand, the
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phenomenology of perceptions depends on the neuro-computational properties of
the subject. Following Pautz (2010), we may call this the ‘‘internal-dependence’’ of
perceptions. A good theory of perception must account for both the external-
directedness and the internal-dependence.
Naive realism is a theory of perception often advertised for its elegant way of
accommodating the external-directedness of perceptions. But its critics have
complained that naive realism fails to accommodate the internal-dependence of
perceptions. Here I respond to this criticism. I first argue that internal-dependence
does indeed pose a problem for a specific version of naive realism, called
‘‘selectionism’’. I then develop a different version of naive realism, which is free of
the problem. This version of naive realism—called ‘‘neuro-computational naive
realism’’—accommodates internal-dependence by recognizing the role that the
subject’s neuro-computational properties play in shaping perceptual phenomenol-
ogy. At the same time, neuro-computational naive realism retains the distinctive
naive realist account of the external-directedness of perceptions.1
The structure of the paper is as follows: In Sect. 2 I present naive realism and
selectionism. In Sect. 3 I explain why the internal-dependence of perceptions poses
a problem for selectionism. I discuss and reject selectionist replies in Sects. 4–5. I
then develop neuro-computational naive realism in Sect. 6. In the final Sect. 7 I
answer a possible objection.
2 Naive realism and selectionism
I take naive realism to minimally involve three theses. The first two are more
relevant to external-directedness than to internal-dependence, while the third is the
other way around. So, since internal-dependence will be our more central concern
here, I will mention the first two theses briefly, and then move on to discuss the
third.
The first thesis of naive realism, (NR1), states that perceptions are fundamentally
experiences in which a subject perceives existing mind-independent items.2 This,
along with the assumption that hallucinations are not fundamentally experiences in
which a subject perceives existing mind-independent items, entails minimal
disjunctivism—the view that perceptions and hallucinations are experiences of
distinct fundamental kinds.3 The second thesis of naive realism, (NR2), states that
the S perceives x relation is neither identical to, nor grounded in, representation
1 As will become clear later, neuro-computational naive realism extends and develops upon an idea of
Martin’s (1998). I am deeply indebted to his work.
2 See Brewer (2011, p. 93), Campbell (2002, p. 117), Genone (2016, p. 6), Martin (2002, pp. 392–393,
2004, p. 39, 2006, p. 354) and Snowdon (1990, p. 124).
3 What to say of illusions is trickier; but here I will follow Antony (2011), Brewer (2011), Campbell (in
chap. 4 of his and Cassam’s 2014), Fish (2009), Genone (2014), Kalderon (2011), and Travis (2013) in
taking illusions to be perceptions of some sort. Accordingly, I will henceforth use ‘‘perceptions’’ to
include illusions.
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relations.4 This captures naive realism’s opposition to understanding the S perceives
x relation in representational terms.
By accepting (NR1) and (NR2), one can accommodate the external-directedness
of perceptions. If perceptions fundamentally and non-representationally relate us to
existing mind-independent items, then there is a clear sense in which perceptions
present us with mind-independent reality. And this, in turn, can arguably explain
why perceptions contribute to our abilities to think about this reality, and to know
what is objectively the case. In fact, Campbell (2002) and Putnam (1994) have
argued that naive realism or similar views are required for an adequate explanation
of how we can think about the mind-independent items around us. Relatedly,
McDowell (1996, 2008) and Johnston (2006) have argued that views along the lines
of naive realism provide us with a distinctive account of perceptual knowledge,
which can overcome certain forms of skepticism.5
Now turn to the third thesis of naive realism, which concerns perceptual
phenomenology. We might think of this thesis as having two versions—a standard
version, accepted by all naive realists; and a strengthened version, which is only
accepted by those naive realists who are sometimes called ‘‘selectionists’’.6 In the
next section I will argue that the strengthened selectionist version of the thesis runs
afoul of the internal-dependence of perceptions. But before I do, I must introduce
both versions of the thesis, starting with the standard one.
We may approach the standard version of the third thesis by noting that Brewer
(2011, p. 100), Campbell (2002, p. 116), Fish (2009, pp. 49–50), French (2014,
pp. 395–396), Logue (2012, p. 212), Martin (1998, pp. 173–175) and other naive
realists all hold that the items a subject perceives in having a perception
constitutively shape the perception’s phenomenology. Importantly, however, naive
realists often deny the further claim that only the items a subject perceives in having
a perception shape the perception’s phenomenology. Campbell (in Campbell and
Cassam 2014, chap. 2), for example, suggests that the phenomenology of a
perception is in virtue of three distinct factors: (1) the items perceived, (2) the point
of view, and (3) the features of the perception relation itself. By ‘‘point of view’’
Campbell (2009, pp. 657–658) means not just the time and place from which one
perceives, but a whole set of conditions under which one has the perception. In the
case of the visual modality, these conditions include the lighting conditions and the
relative orientations and distances the subject is to the perceived items. In the case
of other modalities, different conditions might be included. Brewer (2011) has a
similar account of points of view; and he suggests that visual perceptual
4 See Brewer (2011, p. 55), Campbell (2002, pp. 117–118), French (2014, p. 395) and Martin (2004,
p. 39). Some naive realists—e.g., Travis (2013, p. 31) and Austin (1962, p. 11)—take the stronger view
that perceptions do not represent things as being thus and so. But this anti-representationalist view is not a
defining commitment of naive realism, and commitment to it is denied, e.g., by French (2014, p. 395).
5 Whether naive realism is the only view that can boast these advantages, and in particular how naive
realism compares in these respects with views that deny (NR2), are questions I do not have space to
discuss. For a different set of considerations in favor of naive realism, see Martin (2002) and Logue
(2012).
6 See Fish (2009, p. 137) and Pautz (2013, p. 31).
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phenomenology is sensitive to the existence of certain similarities, which can be
visually relevant relative to one’s point of view (see footnotes 21 and 22). With
respect to the features of the perception relation itself, Campbell (in Campbell and
Cassam 2014, pp. 28, 51) suggests that those can account for the phenomenology of
perceiving watchfully or steadily. Similarly, French (2014) suggests that the
perceiving relation can have features that account for the phenomenology of
perceiving blurrily. Brewer (2011, p. 116) holds that the perceiving relation might
be degraded—a feature of the relation which he takes to account for the visual
phenomenology enjoyed by a red/green color-blind subject when she visually
perceives an apple. Other factors may bear on perceptual phenomenology as well:
Fish (2009, chap. 3) writes that the phenomenology of visual perceptions is partly
determined by features of the subject’s visual system, attention mechanisms and
conceptual powers. Campbell (2002, pp. 118–119) similarly recognizes that a
subject’s neuro-computational properties may bear on her perceptual phenomenol-
ogy. And Brewer (2011, chap. 5, 2013) suggests that some aspects of visual
perceptual phenomenology are sensitive to certain mental episodes of similarity
registration.
In view of the diversity of factors (other than the items perceived) that naive
realists say bear on the phenomenology of a perception, it will be convenient to have
a way of collectively referring to all of them. I will use the term ‘‘standpoint’’.7 Let
the standpoint of a given perception be the set of all the conditions which naive
realists recognize as bearing on the phenomenology of that perception, except for
the items perceived. In the case of vision, these conditions include both extra-
dermal conditions of perception (e.g., location and orientation conditions, lighting
conditions), as well as conditions of the perceiver’s psychological apparatus (e.g.,
idiosyncrasies of her visual system, attention patterns, and cognitive processing).
With the term ‘‘standpoint’’ so understood, the standard version of the third thesis
of naive realism, (NR3), can now be expressed thus: A perception has the
phenomenology that it does in virtue of (1) the items perceived in the perception,
and (2) the standpoint of the perception. Note that this thesis specifies neither what
the perceptual standpoint itself, nor what the perceived items themselves, contribute
to the determination of a perception’s phenomenology. When it comes to the
separate phenomenological contributions of the standpoint and the perceived items,
(NR3) is silent.
Since (NR3) is silent on the extent to which standpoints shape perceptual
phenomenology, it does not obviously conflict with the internal-dependence of
perceptions. In fact, in Sect. 6 I outline how (NR3) can be seen as compatible with
internal-dependence. But the same is not true (NR3)’s strengthened version—the
version accepted by the selectionist naive realist.
Selectionists—e.g., Fish (2009, pp. 75, 137–138) and Allen (2016, pp. 13–14 and
chap. 3)—significantly strengthen (NR3) by adding two further commitments to it.
The first is that a perception has the phenomenology that it does completely in virtue
of the items perceived in the perception. The second is that standpoint conditions
7 In using this term I follow Campbell (2009).
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serve to select which of the many items in the subject’s environment the subject
perceives. According to selectionism then, the role of standpoints is restricted to the
selection of the items perceived. Once selected, these items alone determine the
phenomenology of the subject’s perception.8 For example, when you fix your gaze
on a yellow and crescent shaped banana, standpoint conditions may determine that
you perceive the banana’s being yellow and crescent-shaped. (A banana’s being
yellow is, on this view, a mind-independent item.) And it is completely in virtue of
your perceiving of the banana’s being yellow and crescent-shaped that the banana
appears yellow and crescent-shaped to you.9
Like other forms of naive realism, selectionism does a great job explaining
external-directedness. But I will now argue that it cannot explain internal-
dependence.
3 Selectionism cannot accommodate internal-dependence: the initial
challenge
According to selectionism, a perception has the phenomenology that it does
completely in virtue of the mind-independent items perceived in the perception.
This entails that, necessarily, two perceptions of the exact same mind-independent
items have the same phenomenology. Unfortunately, however, three empirical
arguments put this claim under pressure:
• Attentional variation Empirical results show that phenomenal contrast, satura-
tion, size, spatial frequency, gap size and flicker rate can be modulated by the
subject’s attention patterns.10 In particular, if you present a subject with two
identical Gabor patches (grids of sinusoidal luminance stripes) and you make her
involuntarily attend to one of them more than to the other, the attended patch
would look a higher contrast to her than the unattended one. So following Block
(2010), let’s suppose you and another normal perceiver look at the same pair of
identical Gabor patches under the same normal extra-dermal circumstances. The
only difference is that you attend to both patches equally, while your partner
(involuntarily) attends more to the right patch. Evidence suggests that the right
patch would look different contrasts to each of you. Nevertheless, it is plausible
that you both perceive the same items, since you are both normal perceivers
placed in the same normal extra-dermal conditions.
8 Some readers may already feel that phenomena such as blurry vision and attention-based modulation of
perceptual phenomenology show that selectionism is too strong to be plausible as stated. These are indeed
serious concerns; which may well invite the kind of weakened selectionism discussed in Sect. 5. Also see
footnote 29.
9 The example is adapted from Logue (2012, p. 211).
10 See Carrasco et al. (2004), Gobell and Carrasco (2005), Ling and Carrasco (2006), Liu et al. (2009)
and Montagna et al. (2009).
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• Shifted spectra Empirical results show that variations in sex, race and age are
associated with variations in the colors that things look to subjects.11 So again
following Block (2007a), let’s suppose you and another normal color perceiver
of a different sex, race and age are looking at the same color stimulus under the
same extra-dermal conditions.12 It is empirically plausible that you would have
perceptions with distinct color phenomenology, though you perceive the same
items.
• Coincidental variation Empirical results show that similarities in taste, smell,
loudness, and color experiences are well correlated with similarities in the
experiencer’s neuro-computational properties, but poorly correlated with
similarities in the perceived properties.13 Appealing to this fact, Pautz
(2011, 2014, 2017) has argued the following: Suppose you have a twin who
belongs to a human-like species. The cross-species similarity ensures that under
the same extra-dermal conditions, your and your twin’s perceptual systems
causally interact with the same environmental items, and exhibit post-receptoral
neural response patterns that track the same environmental items to the same
optimal degree. Nevertheless, the response patterns themselves are different.
When you look at blue things, the distributed neural response of your V4 area
resembles the response that area has when you look at purple things but not the
response it has when you look at green things. By the empirically-established
link between neural similarity and phenomenal similarity, it follows that blue
things and purple things look similar in color to you, and that blue things and
green things look dissimilar in color to you. On the other hand, when your twin
looks at blue things, the distributed neural response of her V4 area resembles the
response that area has when she looks at green things but not the response it has
when she looks at purple things. By the empirically-established link between
neural similarity and phenomenal similarity, it follows that blue things and green
things look similar in color to your twin, and that blue things and purple things
look dissimilar in color to your twin. Now, since blue things and green things
look similar in color to your twin but not to you, and since blue things and purple
things look similar in color to you but not to your twin, blue things look different
colors to you and to your twin. So consider a particular instance in which you
and your twin look at a blue ball under the same normal extra-dermal conditions.
By the last argument, that ball looks different colors to you and to your twin. But
since the extra-dermal conditions are fixed, and since you and your twin’s
11 See Hurvich et al. (1968), Neitz and Jacobs (1986), Hardin (1988), Lutze et al. (1990), Neitz et al.
(1993) and Neitz and Neitz (1998).
12 The philosophical significance of these cases has also been discussed by Sydney Shoemaker (2000)
and Hardin (1988).
13 For correlations regarding taste, see Schiffman and Erickson (1971), Smith et al. (1983), Van der
Heijden (1993), Walters (1996), Di Lorenzo et al. (2009), Sakurai et al. (2010) and Chen et al. (2011). For
those regarding smell, see Malnic et al. (1999), Cowart and Rawson (2005), Youngentob et al. (2006),
Margot (2009) and Howard et al. (2009). For those regarding loudness, see Ro¨hl et al. (2011), Langers
et al. (2007), Moore (2003) and Relkin and Doucet (1997). Finally, for those regarding color, see
MacAdam (1985) and Brouwer and Heeger (2013).
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perceptual systems optimally track the same environmental items, you plausibly
both perceive the exact same items.
We now have three cases in which two subjects have perceptions that differ in color
or contrast phenomenology, even though the subjects are under identical extra-
dermal conditions. This suggests that perceptions are internally-dependent, i.e., that
perceptual phenomenology depends on the neuro-computational properties of the
subject. Furthermore, in each of the cases the subjects plausibly perceive the same
items. So we seem to also have cases in which the identity of the perceived items is
conjoined with distinctness in perceptual phenomenology. If so, selectionism is
refuted.
Faced with these arguments, a selectionist could offer one of two responses: the
subjects perceive different mind-independent items, or the subjects in fact have
perceptions with the same phenomenology. I will argue that neither response works.
Then I will suggest a quite different form of naive realism.
4 Response 1: Different items perceived?
The first selectionist response is to say, in a given case, that the two subjects
perceive different mind-independent items. But what might these different items be?
A natural answer would be that the mind-independent colors one perceives
determine one’s perceptual color phenomenology, and that the mind-independent
contrasts one perceives determine one’s perceptual contrast phenomenology.
Differences in perceptual color phenomenology are therefore due to differences
in the colors one perceives, while differences in perceptual contrast phenomenology
are due differences in the contrasts one perceives. If we apply this to our cases, we
will say that since the subjects in the shifted spectra and coincidental variation cases
have perceptions that differ in color phenomenology, they perceive different colors.
Similarly, since the subjects in the attentional variation case have perceptions that
differ in contrast phenomenology, they perceive different contrasts.
This selectionist line of thought can be further articulated in several ways: (1)
Fish (2009, pp. 165–177) suggests that certain cognitive and optical illusions occur
when psychological processes bring about two effects simultaneously. First, the
subject is prevented from perceiving a certain mind-independent item, which she
would otherwise have perceived. Second, the subject comes to believe that a
different item is (or, seems to be) there. This idea can be applied in our cases. In any
one of them, we could say that one subject perceives the color or contrast that is
before her. The other subject (because of some psychological reason) does not
perceive any color or contrast. Nevertheless, the subject believes that some other
color or contrast is (seems to be) there. (2) Here is an alternative suggestion. Let’s
say that two color or contrast properties overlap just in case their degrees of
determinacy allow them to be co-instantiated. For example, being blue (being 22%
in contrast) and being a color between bluish-green and bluish-red (being 16–28%
in contrast) are overlapping properties. Similarly, being a color between bluish-
green and reddish-blue (being 16–23% in contrast) and being a color between
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greenish-blue and bluish-red (being 21–28% in contrast) are overlapping properties.
Using this terminology, we can suggest that in any one of our cases, the subjects
perceive distinct but overlapping color or contrast properties. These differences
account for the differences in their perceptual color or contrast phenomenologies.14
(3) Byrne and Hilbert (1997) favorably consider the proposal that objects can be
both unique green (i.e., green that is neither yellowish nor bluish) and bluish green
all over and at the same time. They develop this proposal by first suggesting that
colors are, roughly, types of surface spectral reflectances. They then suggest that
such types might intersect. In particular, the surface spectral reflectance type
identical to unique green might intersect with the surface spectral reflectance type
identical to bluish green. In that case, some surface spectral reflectance would
belong to both types; and any object which had that surface spectral reflectance
would be both unique green and bluish green. Now, while Byrne and Hilbert are not
selectionists themselves, a selectionist could use their proposal to account for cases
in which a single object looks unique green to one normal subject but bluish green
to another normal subject, despite the fact that both subjects are under fixed extra-
dermal conditions. The account would be that for some reason, one subject
perceives the unique greenness of the object; while the other perceives its bluish-
greenness. Interestingly, Fish considers a related suggestion in his (2009, p. 154,
footnote 3).
Though all these suggestions are worthy of consideration, Pautz’s coincidental
variation case poses a particularly serious problem for them. This is because Pautz
explicitly designed the coincidental variation case to rule out the possibility that the
subjects in the case perceive different items. As we noted in Sect. 3, Pautz rules out
this possibility by stipulating that the perceptual systems of the two subjects in the
case optimally track the same environmental items. Given this stipulation, the
‘‘different items perceived’’ response (in any of its forms) appears implausible for
the coincidental variation case.
I doubt, however, that selectionists will accept this assessment of the situation;
and in fact, some have already resisted it. In particular, Allen (2016, pp. 65–73) has
insisted that in a version of the coincidental variation case in which a single ball
appears blue to you but green to your twin, you and your twin perceive completely
different colors of the ball. According to Allen, this is possible because objects can
have multiple mind-independent colors (and, more broadly, multiple mind-
independent qualitative natures) at a time. Furthermore, Allen denies that if
subjects’ perceptual systems optimally track the same items, then they perceive the
same colors. According to him, even if you and your twin’s perceptual systems
optimally track the same items, you two may still perceive different colors—
assuming that you two also enjoy different post-receptoral neural response patterns.
Though Allen’s proposal is ingenious, I do not believe it can be accepted; and I
will now argue, with Pautz, that the subjects in the coincidental variation case
14 James Stazicker (2011) discusses the interaction between visual indeterminacy and attention. I am
grateful to him for a discussion of this alternative.
O. Beck
123
perceive the same colors. I will do so by focusing on a particular instance of the
coincidental variation case.
Before I introduce the instance of the coincidental variation case I have in mind,
let’s recall two empirical results concerning human color perception. The first is that
normal color perceivers enjoy color constancy: To a remarkable extent, they
perceive stable colors over a wide range of illumination conditions. Though the
neural mechanisms responsible for color constancy are not fully understood, there is
significant evidence that the phenomenon is (at least in part) due to post-receptoral
neural response patterns that recover object colors from the retinal input (which
confounds these colors with features of the illumination).15 This suggests, at least on
the assumption that colors are perceptible mind-independent items, that there are
post-receptoral neural response patterns that track perceived colors. The second
result is that the post-receptoral neural response patterns which track colors causally
enable normal color perceivers to (a) discriminate between areas that are different
(even if similar) colors, (b) attend to colored areas, (c) visually guide various actions
on colored areas, and (d) recognize colored areas as being the colors that they are—
all in the service of the goals of the perceivers.16 Equipped with these empirical
results, we can consider the following instance of Pautz’s coincidental variation
case:
• Coincidental variation* Suppose you are a normal color perceiver, who has a
twin belonging to a human-like species. The cross-species similarity ensures
three things: First, under the same extra-dermal conditions, your and your twin’s
perceptual systems causally interact with the same environmental items, and
exhibit post-receptoral neural response patterns that track the same environ-
mental items to the same optimal degree. Second, like you, when your twin
perceives a color, her post-receptoral neural response patterns track that color.
Third, like you, when your twin’s post-receptoral neural response pattern tracks
a color, that tracking causally enables her to (a) discriminate between the area
that is that color and nearby areas that are different (even if similar) colors,
(b) attend to the area that is that color, (c) visually guide various actions on the
area that is that color, and (d) recognize the area that is that color as being that
color—all in the service of her goals. Nevertheless, your and your twin’s neural
response patterns are themselves different. When you look at blue things, the
distributed neural response of your V4 area resembles the response that area has
when you look at purple things but not the response it has when you look at
green things. When your twin looks at blue things, the distributed neural
response of her V4 area resembles the response that area has when she looks at
green things but not the response it has when she looks at purple things. Now
consider a particular instance in which you and your twin look at a blue ball
under the same normal extra-dermal conditions.
15 See Brouwer and Heeger (2009), Foster (2011) and Roe et al. (2012).
16 See Hardin (1988), Brouwer and Heeger (2013) and Roe et al. (2012).
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I will argue that in this coincidental variation* case, the blue ball looks different
colors to you and to your twin. At the same time, both you and your twin perceive
the same colors.
The argument that the blue ball looks different colors to you and to your twin is
familiar from Sect. 3: When you look at the blue ball, the distributed neural
response of your V4 area resembles the response that area has when you look at
purple things but not the response it has when you look at green things. By the
empirically-established link between neural similarity and phenomenal similarity, it
follows that the blue ball and purple things look similar in color to you, and that the
blue ball and green things look dissimilar in color to you. On the other hand, when
your twin looks at the blue ball, the distributed neural response of her V4 area
resembles the response that area has when she looks at green things but not the
response it has when she looks at purple things. By the empirically-established link
between neural similarity and phenomenal similarity, it follows that the blue ball
and green things look similar in color to your twin, and that the blue ball and purple
things look dissimilar in color to your twin. Now, since the blue ball and green
things look similar in color to your twin but not to you, and since the blue ball and
purple things look similar in color to you but not to your twin, the blue ball looks
different colors to you and to your twin.
It remains to argue that both you and your twin perceive the same colors. To see
why this is so, suppose (for reductio) that as you look at the blue ball, you and your
twin perceive different colors. If you perceive different colors, there is a color C that
is perceived by one of you, but not by the other. Consider the subject that does
perceive C. By the stipulations of the case, that subject—whether she is human or
merely human-like—has a post-receptoral neural response pattern that tracks color
C. The stipulations also say that both you and your twin are under the same extra-
dermal conditions; and that when you two are under the same extra-dermal
conditions, you both have post-receptoral neural response patterns that track the
same environmental items. So if one of you has a post-receptoral neural response
pattern that tracks color C, the other does as well. It follows that both you and your
twin have post-receptoral neural response patterns that track color C. Finally, the
case’s stipulations say that when you and your twin have post-receptoral neural
response patterns that track a color, that tracking causally enables both of you to
(a) discriminate between the area that is that color and nearby areas that are different
(even if similar) colors, (b) attend to the area that is that color, (c) visually guide
various actions on the area that is that color, and (d) recognize the area that is that
color as being that color—all in the service of your respective goals. Therefore, your
and your twin’s tracking of color C causally enable both of you to (a) discriminate
between the area that is C and nearby areas that are different (even if similar) colors,
(b) attend to the area that is C, (c) visually guide various actions on the area that is
C, and (d) recognize the area that is C as being C—all in the service of your
respective goals.
Now consider the following principle:
(P) If (i) S’s visual perception system exhibits a post-receptoral neural response
pattern that tracks a color C, and (ii) that tracking causally enables S to
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(a) discriminate between the area that is C and nearby areas that are different
(even if similar) colors, (b) attend to the area that is C, (c) visually guide
various actions on the area that is C, and (d) recognize the area that is C as
being C—all in the service of S’s goals, then S visually perceives color C.
Principle (P) is supported by the results and methods of perceptual psychology.
Perceptual psychology is a fruitful and quickly advancing science. This science
seeks to explain the perception of various kinds of items by finding mechanisms by
which such items are tracked, and by showing how the tracking contributes to the
perceivers’ abilities to perform tasks that perceivers of these items can distinctively
perform for the advancement of their goals.17 Perceptual psychology has had
significant successes in doing this for color perception.18 Though the full details of
color perception are still far from fully understood, existing results do suggest that a
subject S’s perception of C is explained by the truth of (P)’s antecedent. And if the
truth of (P)’s antecedent explains S’s perception of C, then (P) is itself true.
Now apply principle (P) to the coincidental variation* case. We have already
established that the case is one in which both you and your twin satisfy (P)’s
antecedent with respect to color C. Therefore, both you and your twin perceive color
C. But, ex hypothesi, C is a color that is perceived by one of you, but not by the
other. Contradiction. It follows that, for any color C, either you and your twin both
perceive it, or neither of you do. Furthermore, since you and your twin have
perceptions with different color phenomenologies, the selectionist suggestion that
the mind-independent colors one perceives determine one’s perceptual color
phenomenology is false.
At this point, selectionists might make a partial retreat. They might concede that
the mind-independent colors one perceives do not determine one’s perceptual color
phenomenology. But they might still insist that some mind-independent items that
one perceives do determine one’s perceptual color phenomenology. They might also
insist that the subjects in the coincidental variation* case do not perceive exactly the
same mind-independent items. Thus, they might try to retain selectionism in the
face of the coincidental variation* case.
This selectionist response requires that some mind-independent items that one
perceives determine one’s perceptual color phenomenology. The trouble is that it is
difficult to see what these items might be. To illustrate the difficulty, I will consider
three possibilities.
First, consider the possibility that the mind-independent visually basic properties
that one perceives determine one’s perceptual color phenomenology. By ‘‘visually
basic properties’’ I have in mind, in addition to colors, also properties like sizes,
shapes, visible textures and spatial arrangements.19 This possibility is unattractive
17 See Marr (1982) and Palmer (1999).
18 In addition to the aforementioned results, see Conway et al. (2010).
19 It was suggested to me that Martin motivates this view in his (2010). I disagree. In (2010) Martin
argues for the ‘‘parsimonious’’ view that ‘‘objective looks’’ can be identified with visually basic
properties. He (2010, pp. 220–221) takes this identification to suggest that a straight stick in open air and
a straight stick half submerged in water have the same objective looks. And he further appeals to such
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for two reasons: (1) The perception of visually basic properties is—like the
perception of colors—plausibly explainable by appeal to neural responses which
track these properties and then enable subjects to perform distinctive tasks for the
advancement of their goals. Therefore, arguments using principles analogous to
(P) could plausibly show that subjects in cases like the coincidental variation* case
perceive the same visually basic properties. If so, those cases would constitute
counterexamples to the thesis that the mind-independent visually basic properties
one perceives determine one’s perceptual color phenomenology. (2) We know from
the coincidental variation* case that the perception of a ball’s color does not
determine the perceptual color phenomenology associated with the ball. We also
know—from our own experiences—that the perception of a ball’s size, shape,
visible texture or spatial arrangement does not determine the perceptual color
phenomenology associated with the ball. Together, these two data points make it
highly implausible that the perception of any subset of a ball’s visually basic
properties determines the perceptual color phenomenology associated with the ball.
So, again, it appears that the visually basic properties one perceives do not
determine one’s perceptual color phenomenology.
Second, consider the possibility that subjects normally perceive their own neuro-
computational properties; and that the neuro-computational properties that one
perceives determine one’s perceptual color phenomenology. This possibility is
unattractive simply because it is implausible that we normally perceive our own
neuro-computational properties. Visual perception requires there to be a causal
chain which leads from the perceived item to the eyes, and from there to the
subject’s visual cortex. But normally, there is no such chain leading from our neuro-
computational properties to our eyes and from there to our visual cortex. More
importantly, visual perception usually enables us to visually discriminate the
perceived item from the rest of the environment. But normally we cannot so
discriminate our neuro-computational properties. Lastly, visual perception usually
enables us to attend to the perceived items. But, again, we normally cannot so attend
to our neuro-computational properties.
Third, consider suggestions made by Fish (2009, pp. 150–161) and Genone
(2014). According to them, objects can have relational properties of (roughly) the
kind ‘‘being color C, under such and so illumination, and in such and so surround’’.
Call these properties ‘‘relational colors’’. Fish and Genone hold that when normal
subjects are normally presented with such relational colors, the subjects perceive
these relational colors. And the relational colors subjects perceive determine (at
least the most specific features of) the subjects’ perceptual color phenomenology.
Footnote 19 continued
objective looks in offering a ‘‘minimalist’’ account of statements about how things look (to S). On this
account, these statements often involve implicit comparisons between the objective looks of objects or the
sensory episodes of subjects on the one hand, and contextually relevant paradigm cases on the other.
Martin insists that this account is minimal, because it ‘‘commits us hardly at all to the underlying nature of
sense experience. …And indeed, the point of the account … is not to offer grounds for preferring one
theory of sensory experience over another’’ (2010, pp. 222–223). In view of this, I think that one would be
over-reading Martin’s paper were one to take it to be a defense of selectionism. I will return to Martin’s
views in Sect. 6.
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For example, here is how Fish and Genone explain why white things look different
shades to people when under white and yellow lights: Under white lights, white
things have ‘‘whitish’’ relational colors; while under yellow lights they have
‘‘yellowish’’ relational colors. When normal subjects are normally presented with
whitish relational colors, they perceive the whitish relational color. So things look
whitish to them. When normal subjects are normally presented yellowish relational
colors, they likewise perceive the yellowish relational colors. So things look
yellowish to them. Thus, white things look different shades to people when under
white and yellow lights.
It appears, however, that Fish and Genone’s position cannot provide a
selectionist-friendly treatment of the coincidental variation* case. In the coinci-
dental variation* case, both subjects are looking at the same scene, under the same
extra-dermal conditions. In particular, they are looking at the same blue ball, under
the same illumination and in the same surround. So they are facing the same
relational colors. Furthermore, the subjects perceive the same relational colors. This
is because, according to Fish and Genone, when normal subjects are normally
presented with relational colors, they perceive them. And in the coincidental
variation case, both subjects are normal, and normally presented with the same
relational colors. We thus have a case in which two subjects perceive the same
relational colors, though their perceptions have different color phenomenologies. So
it cannot be that the relational colors one perceives determine one’s perceptual color
phenomenology.
In defense of Fish and Genone, one might propose that the properties that are
relevant to determining one’s perceptual color phenomenology are not the relational
colors Fish and Genone discuss, but something similar. In particular, one might
propose that objects have relational colors*—properties of (roughly) the kind
‘‘being color C, under such and so illumination, in such and so surround, and
causing the instantiation of such and so neuro-computational properties’’. It is the
perception of these relational colors* that determines one’s perceptual color
phenomenology.
This proposal has the advantage of being immune to the argument in the previous
paragraph: Ex hypothesi, the subjects in the coincidental variation* case have
different neuro-computational properties. Given the definition of relational colors*,
this suggests the subjects also face different relational colors*.
Unfortunately, however, the proposal also has a disadvantage. I argued earlier
that we do not normally perceive our own neuro-computational properties. It is even
clearer that we do not normally perceive the neuro-computational properties of
others. So, in general, we do not normally perceive any neuro-computational
properties. A fortiori, we do not normally perceive colors’ causing instantiations of
any neuro-computational properties. Much less do we normally perceive colors’,
under given illumination conditions and in given surround conditions, causing
instantiations of any neuro-computational properties. And this, given the definition
of relational colors*, suggests that we do not normally perceive relational colors*.
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5 Response 2: Same phenomenology?
An alternative way of defending selectionism is to suggest, with respect to at least
some of our cases, that the subjects’ perceptions have the same phenomenology.
Stated so strongly, this alternative defense of selectionism is flatly contradicted
by aforementioned empirical findings. But it turns out that if selectionism is
somewhat weakened, a more sophisticated version of this defense becomes
available.
The weakened version of selectionism concedes that some aspects of phe-
nomenology are not completely in virtue of the items the subject perceives. So it is
no longer necessarily true that if two subjects perceive the same items, their
perceptions have the same phenomenology. Nevertheless, the view is still somewhat
selectionist, as it insists that there are aspects of phenomenology (call them ‘‘core
phenomenal aspects’’) which are completely in virtue of the items the subject
perceives. The suggestion is thus that S’s standpoint plays the role of selecting the
items that S perceives, and that the core phenomenal aspects of the subject’s
perception are completely in virtue of those items. Thus, if two subjects perceive the
same items, though their perceptions may differ in some phenomenal ways, the
perceptions will necessarily have the same core phenomenal aspects.
This weakened selectionism can be used to accommodate our cases in two ways.
First, one might concede (in a given case) that things look distinct colors/contrasts
to the subjects, but deny that this constitutes a difference in the core phenomenal
aspects of perception. Alternatively, one might insist (in a given case) that things
look the same color/contrast to both subjects; and that the empirically verified
phenomenal differences between them concern other, non-core, aspects.
The first of these two suggestions is unattractive. To see this, consider the
robustness of the empirical results driving the attentional variation, shifted spectra
and coincidental variation cases. Put together, these results imply that it is possible
for two subjects to perceive the same items, while their perceptions differ not just
color or contrast phenomenology, but also in saturation, size, spatial frequency, gap
size, flicker rate, taste, smell or loudness phenomenology. If we answer all the
putative counterexamples to selectionism along the lines suggested by the first
suggestion, we will be saying that the phenomenal aspects associated with color,
contrast, saturation, size, spatial frequency, gap size, flicker rate, taste, smell and
loudness are not core phenomenal aspects. In that case, it is unclear what
phenomenal aspects of perception would be left over for selectionism to account for.
At best, the remaining set of core phenomenal aspects would be a meager and
disjointed one. And though a version of selectionism that can only account for those
phenomenal aspects is not without interest, I think we should at least pause before
accepting it.20
Consider the second suggestion next. To review, the suggestion is that both
subjects (in a given case) enjoy the same color or contrast phenomenology; and that
phenomenal differences between them concern non-core aspects. Interestingly,
20 Cf. Logue (2012, 2017).
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Brewer (2013) has developed a response along these exact lines for the attentional
variation case.
Somewhat amended to fit with weakened selectionism, Brewer’s (2011, chap. 5,
2013) view is as follows: There are ways that objects thinly look to us, and ways that
objects thickly looks to us. An object o thinly looks F to S iff S perceives o’s being
F-like. This suggests that objects thinly look to us as they do completely in virtue of
the items we perceive. Therefore, ways objects thinly look to us count as core
phenomenal aspects.21 At the same time, an object o thickly looks F to S iff o thinly
looks F to S, and S mentally registers that o is F-like.22 This suggests that objects do
not thickly look to us as they do completely in virtue of the items we perceive. Ways
objects thickly look to us are thus not core phenomenal aspects.
Now in the attentional variation case, Brewer (2013) suggests that the subjects’
perceptions have the same core phenomenal aspects, since the Gabor patch thinly
looks exactly the same to both of them. But the patch thickly looks different
contrasts to them, because the subjects’ different attention patterns lead each of
them to mentally register different things.
Brewer’s account of the case is ingenious. On the one hand, it appears consistent
with the empirical results, since it describes the subjects as enjoying different
(‘‘thick’’) contrast phenomenologies. On the other hand, the account brings out a
way of preserving a weakened version of selectionism.
Unfortunately, Brewer’s account cannot be accepted. The key problem concerns
Brewer’s position on thick looks. It entails that if o thickly looks F to S, then o also
thinly looks F to S. Now in the attentional variation case, Brewer says that the
Gabor patch thickly looks different contrasts to the subjects. So he must also say
that the patch thinly looks different contrasts to them. How is this consistent with his
suggestion that the patch thinly looks exactly the same to them?
Brewer (2011, p. 125, 2013) attempts to answer this question. He notes that white
chalks in red light simultaneously thinly look both red and white-and-in-red-light to
perceivers. This shows that objects can simultaneously thinly look multiple ways to
perceivers. If so, there is no problem in suggesting that in the attentional variation
case, the Gabor patch simultaneously thinly looks two distinct contrasts to the
subjects. In thinly looking both these contrasts to both subjects, it thinly looks
exactly the same to them. Nonetheless, if one subject registers only one contrast-
related feature of the patch, while the other registers only the other contrast-related
feature of the patch, the patch would thickly look distinct contrasts to each of them.
But this answer is misleading, as it fails to distinguish between competing and
non-competing looks. I say that F looks and G looks compete iff nothing could
21 Brewer’s unamended suggestion is that o thinly looks F to S iff S is acquainted with o from a point of
view relative to which o has visually relevant similarities to paradigm Fs; where a paradigm F is a
possible F object which we (qua English speakers) associate with the term ‘‘F’’ in understanding the term.
This entails that objects thinly look to us as they do partly in virtue of certain unperceived similarity
relations the objects bear to certain paradigms. So on Brewer’s unamended suggestion, ways objects
thinly look to us do not count as core phenomenal aspects. Also see footnote 22.
22 Brewer’s unamended suggestion is that o thickly looks F to S iff o thinly looks F to S, and S mentally
registers its visually relevant similarities to paradigm Fs; where the registration can occur either by an
active application of the concept F, or by imagistic or behavioral means. Also see footnote 21.
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simultaneously appear both F and G to a normal perceiver under normal conditions.
A red look and a white-in-red-light look are not competing looks because white
chalks in red light do look like both red-chalks-in-white-light and white-chalks-in-
red-light to normal perceivers under normal conditions. In contrast, a red look and a
white look are competing looks, because nothing could simultaneously look both
red and white to a normal perceiver under normal conditions.
The notion of competing looks places a plausibility constraint on ‘‘thin looks’’
claims. It is implausible to claim that a white chalk in red light simultaneously
thinly looks both red and white to people, if nothing could simultaneously look both
red and white to them. And generally, it is implausible to claim that o thinly looks
both F and G to normal perceivers in normal conditions, if an F look and a G look
are competing looks. Claims that violate this constraint cannot be taken as plausible
descriptions of normal experiences. They could perhaps be taken as pieces of
philosophical theorizing, but in that case they would shed little light on normal
phenomenology.
Now return to the attentional variation case, where a patch looks distinct
contrasts to distinct subjects. For concreteness, say it looks 18% contrast to one, and
22% contrast to the other. If Brewer’s account of the case is to succeed, the patch
must thinly look both 18 and 22% contrast to both. But this claim violates our
constraint. Nothing can simultaneously look both 18 and 22% contrast to a normal
perceiver under normal conditions. So Brewer’s account fails.
One might offer two responses on Brewer’s behalf. The first is to describe the
case as involving variable degrees of phenomenal determinacy. E.g., perhaps the
patch thinly looks both a determinate 22% and an indeterminate 16–28% contrast to
both perceivers, and thickly looks only one of these ways to each. This description
does not violate the plausibility constraint, assuming a patch can simultaneously
look both 22 and 16–28% contrast to a normal perceiver under normal conditions.
However, as Block (2010) argues, the experimental results clearly suggest that the
patches look equally determinate ways to both perceivers. So the first response fails.
The second response draws on Brewer’s discussion of the shifted spectra case
(2011, pp. 127–128). The discussion is difficult, but on one reading it suggests the
following: In the shifted spectra case, a color chip thinly looks a single color to the
two subjects. Nevertheless, because they understand color terms differently, each of
them registers the color-related features of the chip by employing distinct concepts.
Therefore, the chip thickly looks different colors to them. In the attentional variation
case, one could similarly suggest that the patch thinly looks a single contrast to the
subjects. Nevertheless, because they understand contrast terms differently, they each
register the contrast-related features of the patch by employing distinct concepts.
Therefore, the patch thickly looks different contrasts to them.
This response is also unsuccessful. We can stipulate (in both the shifted spectra
and attentional variation cases) that the subjects understand color/contrast terms in
exactly the same way (or in no way at all). This stipulation does not disturb the
empirical evidence suggesting that things look distinct colors/contrasts to the
subjects.
Moving beyond Brewer’s view, let’s ask if there is some other way of arguing
that both subjects (in a given case) have perceptions with the same color or contrast
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phenomenology. Here’s a general reason to say ‘‘no’’: The shifted spectra and
attentional variation cases are based on findings gathered using methods designed to
assess color and contrast phenomenology. These methods have produced a great
deal of evidence most readily explained by hypothesis (H):
(H) When placed in the relevant conditions, the subjects’ perceptions have
different color or contrast phenomenologies.
The view that both subjects (in either of the cases) have perceptions with the
same color or contrast phenomenology, however, denies (H). Instead, it accepts
hypothesis (:H):
(:H) When placed in the relevant conditions, the subjects’ perceptions have the
same color or contrast phenomenology.
Consequently, this view must predict that any reliable test of color or contrast
phenomenology would produce very different evidence than what we in fact have.
This does not mean that the view cannot accommodate the evidence we do have. It
can indeed explain such evidence by appealing to some further hypothesis. But the
point is that the view cannot predict the evidence without a further complicating
hypothesis. And in failing to predict the available evidence without the postulation
of further mechanisms, the view loses much of its plausibility. It is bad methodology
to accept it.
A similar point applies in the coincidental variation case. If the subjects in that
case have perceptions with the same color phenomenology, then similarities in their
perceptual color phenomenology do not correlate with similarities in their
distributed neural responses. But empirical evidence suggests that in actual cases
such similarities are correlated. Therefore, to suggest that subjects in the
coincidental variation case have perceptions with the same color phenomenology
is to also suggest that the observed actual correlation is merely coincidental. And
that is very implausible. As Pautz (2017, p. 31) originally put it, the suggestion has
‘‘the absurd implication that it is just a fluke that in normal humans like yourself
there is quite generally a nice agreement between neural similarity and qualitative
similarity (‘‘good internal correlation’’)—somewhat as it would be a fluke if it
turned out that similar-looking names (e.g., ‘‘Ned’’ and ‘‘Fred’’) always named
similar-looking individuals.’’
6 Neuro-computational naive realism: a way of accommodating
external-directedness and internal-dependence
We can draw two lessons from the previous discussion. The first is that perceptions
are internally-dependent, i.e., their phenomenologies depend on the neuro-compu-
tational properties of the subject. This lesson is particularly evident from the
empirical results at the basis of the coincidental variation case. To repeat, the results
are that there is a strong correlation between neural similarity and phenomenal
similarity. This correlation plausibly suggests that by determining the similarity
relations between your actual neural activation and related possible neural
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activations, we can completely determine what colors things look to you, how loud
things sound to you, as well as how things smell or taste to you. The second lesson
from the previous discussion is that selectionism is false. If we wish to be naive
realists, we should be non-selectionist naive realists.
The rest of this paper is an attempt to take these two lessons seriously. More
specifically, it is an attempt to outline a form of naive realism that is both non-
selectionist, and that acknowledges that perceptions are internally-dependent in the
ways suggested by empirical findings. I call this form of naive realism ‘‘neuro-
computational naive realism’’.
Neuro-computational naive realism is inspired by Martin’s (1998, pp. 173–175)
important idea that
to have an experience is to have a viewpoint on something: experiences
intrinsically possess some subject-matter which is presented to that viewpoint.
To understand such experience and what it is like, one has to understand the
viewpoint on that subject-matter, and hence also to attend to the subject matter
as presented to the viewpoint. …On this view, difference in presented
elements between two experiences will be sufficient for difference in their
phenomenal properties.
Immediately following this passage, Martin (1998, p. 175) adds a remark on the
‘‘much stronger’’ thesis that ‘‘sameness and difference of phenomenal properties just
are sameness and difference in presented elements’’:
It is doubtful that this claim is true: why cannot the ways in which things are
presented in experience make a difference to what the experience is like, in
addition to what is presented?
Martin is suggesting that aspects of perceptual phenomenology are not mere
presentations of items. Rather, they are presentations of items in certain ways. In
other words, Martin accepts a ‘‘multiple component’’ thesis, according to which
aspects of perceptual phenomenology have both a presented item component and a
way of presentation component. This entails that perceptions presenting distinct
items will be perceptions with distinct phenomenologies. But it also allows
perceptions of the same items to differ in their phenomenologies, when the items are
presented to the perceiver in different ways.
I wish to elaborate Martin’s multiple component thesis by making three
suggestions. First, I distinguish between (1) items that perceptually appear to
subjects, (2) subjects’ appearance properties and (iii) the perceptual appearance
relation. The items that perceptually appear to subjects broadly correspond to
Martin’s presented items. So, for example, a particular ball can perceptually appear
to you various ways. So can its size or shape. Appearance properties, on the other
hand, broadly correspond to Martin’s ways of presentation. To have an appearance
property is to be appeared to in a certain way. For example, you can be appeared to
O. Beck
123
in a roundish way, or in a bluish way.23,24 Finally, the perceptual appearance
relation is the three place relation x perceptually appears W to S. This is a relation
that obtains between a subject S, an appearance property W that S instantiates, and
an item x. When S stands in this relation to some item x and to some appearance
property W, not only is S appeared to in some way, but furthermore, x perceptually
appears that way to S. For example, when you stand in this relation to both a
particular ball and the appearance property of being appeared to in a roundish way,
not only are you roundishly appeared to, but furthermore, the ball perceptually
appears round to you. Note that since both perceptually appearing items and
appearance properties are relata of the x perceptually appears W to S relation,
instantiations of this relation have perceptually appearing items and appearance
properties as constituents. Thus, when the x perceptually appears W to S relation is
instantiated in the ball’s perceptually appearing round to you, the constituents of this
instantiation are yourself, your property of being appeared to in a roundish way, and
the ball.
My second suggestion is that the relation x perceptually appears W to S is
intimately connected to the relation S perceives x. The two relations are connected
by the fact that, necessarily, if x perceptually appears W to S, then S perceives x. For
example, if a ball appears round to you, you must perceive that very ball. This
ensures that perceived items shape conscious perceptual phenomenology, as (NR3)
requires. It also ensures that subjects who consciously perceive distinct items will
thereby have perceptions with distinct phenomenologies.
My third suggestion concerns appearance properties. What determines which
appearance property W a subject instantiates at a time? Here is the appropriate place
to consider the aforementioned empirical results. Properly construed, these results
suggest that subjects have the appearance properties that they do completely in
virtue of their standpoints, and in particular, completely in virtue of their neuro-
computational properties.25 In other words, your neuro-computational properties
completely determine the ways you are appeared to.26 But note: To say that your
neuro-computational properties completely determine your appearance properties is
not to say that your neuro-computational properties completely determine your
23 How ways of being appeared to should be specified is, of course a vexed question (see, e.g., Block
2007b). Happily, for our purposes it is enough to note that by ‘‘S is being appeared to in a roundish way’’ I
roughly mean that S is appeared to in the way that I would be appeared to were I to now be confronted by
a round thing under ideal conditions.
24 My use of ‘‘appearance properties’’ is different from Genone (2014), Antony (2011), Kalderon (2011),
Shoemaker (1994, 2000, 2006) and others’ use of ‘‘appearance properties’’. On their use of the term,
appearance properties are not properties that subjects can have, but properties that objects or scenes can
have. More specifically, appearance properties are ways that objects or scenes appear simpliciter (as
opposed to ways that they appear to a specific subject). This use of ‘‘appearance properties’’ should be
carefully distinguished from my own.
25 Note, however, that these properties are probably not restricted to the properties of a particular brain
area. Area-restricted properties can be instanced in a collection of cells growing in a bottle, and those
cells would presumably not be phenomenally conscious.
26 Of course, external events may cause you to have certain neuro-computational properties. In so doing,
external events may play a causal role in the instantiation of appearance properties.
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perceptual phenomenology. Perceptual phenomenology is fixed by instantiations of
the x perceptually appears W to S relation. Appearance properties are among the
relata of this relation, and distinct from it. For example, a ball’s perceptually
appearing round to you is one thing, and your being appeared to in a roundish way is
another. Your neuro-computational properties determine the latter. The former
further requires you to perceive the ball.
These three suggestions, taken together with (NR1)–(NR3), constitute neuro-
computational naive realism. Neuro-computational naive realism accounts for
perceptual phenomenology thus: Suppose a ball (x) perceptually appears round
(W) to you (S). That fixes an aspect of your perceptual phenomenology. Consistently
with (NR3), neuro-computational naive realism holds that you enjoy this aspect in
virtue of your perceiving the ball from a certain standpoint, while having a certain
neuro-computational property. Had you failed to perceive the ball, it would not have
perceptually appeared round to you, and your perceptual phenomenology would
have been different. Similarly, had you been in a suitably different neuro-
computational state, you would not have had the same appearance properties, and
the ball would also not have perceptually appeared round to you. So, again, your
perceptual phenomenology would have been different.
Neuro-computational naive realism has three distinct advantages:
First, neuro-computational naive realism resolves the worry with which this
paper began. The worry was that naive realism is in tension with the fact that
perceptions are internally-dependent (i.e., their phenomenologies depend on the
neuro-computational properties of the subject). The response is that although
selectionist naive realism is in tension with the internal-dependence of perceptions,
neuro-computational naive realism is not. According to neuro-computational naive
realism, the phenomenologies of perceptions consist of instantiations of a three
place relation: x perceptually appears W to S. The second relatum of this relation is
determined by the subject’s neuro-computational properties. Therefore, the
phenomenologies of perceptions are partially determined by the subject’s neuro-
computational properties. There is thus no tension between neuro-computational
naive realism and the fact that perceptions are internally-dependent. At the same
time, the first relatum of the x perceptually appears W to S relation is a perceived
mind-independent item. Therefore, the phenomenologies of perceptions are partially
determined by the mind-independent items that the subject perceives. Perceived
items thus participate in the shaping of perceptual phenomenology.
Importantly, neuro-computational naive realism accommodates the internal-
dependence of perceptions while simultaneously accommodating the external-
directedness of perceptions (i.e., the fact that perceptions present us with a mind-
independent reality). Neuro-computational naive realism accommodates this
external-directedness by accepting (NR1) and (NR2). Together, these theses
suggest that perceptions fundamentally and non-representationally relate us to
existing mind-independent items. So there is a clear sense in which perceptions
present us with mind-independent reality.
The second advantage of neuro-computational naive realism is that it is
consistent with the attentional variation, shifted spectra, coincidental variation, and
coincidental variation* cases. In each of them, it is either an empirical fact or an
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explicit stipulation that the subjects have different neuro-computational properties.
Since the subjects have different neuro-computational properties, it is consistent
with neuro-computational naive realism that the subjects have different appearance
properties as well. It is therefore also consistent with neuro-computational naive
realism that the subjects have perceptions with different phenomenologies. For this
reason, none of the cases poses a problem to neuro-computational naive realism.
The third advantage of neuro-computational naive realism is that it supports the
common sense view that perceptions and hallucinations can be phenomenally
similar. The explanation is simple: A subject who is perceiving and a subject who is
hallucinating can have the same neuro-computational properties. According to
neuro-computational naive realism, a subject’s neuro-computational properties
completely determine what appearance properties she has. It follows that a subject
who is perceiving and a subject who is hallucinating can have the same appearance
properties. In other words, a subject who is perceiving and a subject who is
hallucinating can appeared to in the same ways. For example, you can be appeared
to in a roundish way in both a perception and in a hallucination. Thus, perceptions
and hallucinations can be phenomenally similar.
Importantly, however, while neuro-computational naive realism supports the
view that perceptions and hallucinations can be phenomenally similar, it also
suggests that they are phenomenally different. The difference is that the
phenomenologies of perceptions, but not of hallucinations, involve items’ percep-
tually appearing certain ways to a subject. And for an item to perceptually appear
certain ways to a subject, the subject has to perceive that item. Therefore, whenever
some item perceptually appears some way to a subject, the subject is having a
perception and not a hallucination. And whenever a subject is having a
hallucination, nothing perceptually appears to the subject in the having of that
hallucination. For example, when a ball perceptually appears round to you, you
perceive the ball rather than hallucinate it. And when you hallucinate a ball, neither
the ball nor anything else perceptually appears to you in the having of that
hallucination.27
7 Will naive realists be happy with neuro-computational naive realism?
Despite neuro-computational naive realism’s advantages, I expect that some naive
realists will be inclined to resist it. The naive realists I have in mind are those who
endorse the following two theses28:
27 This briefly sketched view of hallucinations must eventually face Martin’s (2004, 2006) arguments
that disjunctivists should only give negative accounts of hallucinations, i.e., ones which characterize
hallucinations in terms of certain perceptions. These arguments are concerning, because my sketch might
plausibly be charged of being a positive account of hallucinations, which appeals to the hallucinator’s
having certain appearance properties. I nonetheless offer my sketch, as I accept Logue’s (2013) and
Johnston’s (2004, pp. 138–139) dissenting views on how disjunctivists should account for hallucinations.
28 Campbell (in Campbell and Cassam 2014, p. 33), e.g., endorses (Constitution). (Inheritance) is
endorsed, e.g., by Allen (2016, pp. 13–14) and Campbell (1993, p. 268).
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(Constitution) The phenomenologies of perceptions are constituted by mind-
independent qualities of objects (such as colors, shapes and sizes).
(Inheritance) The phenomenologies of perceptions are inherited from mind-
independent qualities of objects (such as colors, shapes and sizes).
Although these theses go well beyond the core commitments of naive realism [i.e.,
beyond (NR1)–(NR3)], naive realists who endorse them would be dissatisfied if
they proved to be incompatible with neuro-computational naive realism. I close this
paper with a discussion of this worry.
Start with (Constitution). Happily, this thesis is fully compatible with neuro-
computational naive realism. According to neuro-computational naive realism,
perceptual phenomenology is fixed by instantiations of the x perceptually appears
W to S relation. Such instantiations have perceptually appearing items x as
constituents. If we required some of these items to be mind-independent qualities of
objects, it would follow that the phenomenologies of perceptions are constituted by
mind-independent qualities of objects, just as the inheritance thesis requires. In
other words, neuro-computational naive realism can retain the inheritance thesis by
holding that any perception has some aspects of perceptual phenomenology in
which mind-independent qualities of objects Q perceptually appear to the subject.
I now turn to (Inheritance). Though this thesis is not completely clear, what it
seems to suggest is that the ways that items perceptually appear to subjects are
inherited from mind-independent qualities of objects. In other words, (Inheritance)
seems to suggest that appearance properties—at least those appearance properties
that are instantiated when things perceptually appear some way to someone—are
inherited from mind-independent qualities of objects. For example, an application of
(Inheritance) to a case in which a ball perceptually appears round to you would
seem to amount to the suggestion that your appearance property of being appeared
to in a roundish way is inherited from the mind-independent quality of roundness
(which round objects have).
It is doubtful that all prominent naive realists would accept (Inheritance). In
particular, Martin’s (1998) view is consistent with rejecting it. It is also doubtful that
(Inheritance) is true.29 So if neuro-computational naive realism proves incompatible
with (Inheritance), it is unclear if that would be a serious cost.
Still, since (Inheritance) is independently interesting, I would like to explore
whether neuro-computational naive realism is compatible with it. I do so by quickly
sketching two versions that neuro-computational naive realism might take—an
29 An anonymous reviewer suggested to me that (Inheritance) must be weakened if it is to survive the
following variant of a case originally due to David Chalmers: Suppose there are two dots right next to
each other on blank field, with a cross between them. While fixing your eyes on the cross, you attend first
to the dot on the right and then to the dot on the left. Since the dots are very close together, it is plausible
that you perceive the properties of the dots at the same level of determinacy. Nevertheless, the empirical
results related to the attentional variation case suggest that the dots would appear differently to you. The
case therefore recommends a weakening of (Inheritance). The reviewer also noted that (Inheritance)
might need to be weakened to accommodate cases of blurry vision. I am very grateful to the reviewer for
both these suggestions. For a further discussion of blurry vision in a naive realist setting, see French
(2014).
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‘‘identity version’’, which is incompatible with (Inheritance); and a ‘‘relational
version’’, which is compatible with (Inheritance).
The identity version suggests that appearance properties are identical to certain
intrinsic neuro-computational properties.30 This raises three issues: First, intrinsic
neuro-computational properties of subjects are not identical to shapes, sizes or any
other mind-independent qualities of objects. Second, intrinsic neuro-computational
properties cannot be relations to mind-independent qualities of objects. And finally,
changes in the distribution of intrinsic neuro-computational properties of subjects
and changes in the distribution of mind-independent qualities of objects can
plausibly occur independently of each other. These three issues make it difficult to
see how intrinsic neuro-computational properties of subjects could be inherited from
mind-independent qualities of objects. So if appearance properties are identical to
certain intrinsic neuro-computational properties of subjects, (Inheritance) would be
false.
Alternatively, the relational version suggests that though subjects have the
appearance properties that they do in virtue of their neuro-computational properties,
appearance properties are distinct from neuro-computational properties. What
appearance properties are identical to is certain non-perceptual relational properties.
More specifically, the relational version suggests that for S to have an appearance
property is for S to bear some non-perceptual relation to a mind independent quality
Q, which reveals Q to S. For example, to be appeared to in a roundish way is to bear
a relation to roundness, which reveals roundness to you. Similarly, to be appeared to
in a blueish way is to bear a relation to blueness, which reveals blueness to you.
Nevertheless, you have the appearance properties you do in virtue of your neuro-
computational properties. So, e.g., though you are related to roundness in being
appeared to in a roundish way, that relationship is due to your neuro-computational
properties.31
The relational version is compatible with (Inheritance) because it seems to
provide a sense in which appearance properties are inherited from mind-
independent qualities of objects. For example, suppose a blue ball perceptually
appears green to Alice. In this case, Alice is appeared to in a greenish way, and so is
(non-perceptually) related to greenness. Greenness is thereby both revealed to Alice,
and is a constituent of Alice’s appearance property. This seems to provide a clear
sense in which Alice’s appearance property is inherited from greenness.
30 The identity version is very similar to Block’s (2009), McLaughlin’s (2007) and Papineau’s (2014)
view that phenomenal properties (which characterize aspects of what it is like to be a subject) are
identical to certain intrinsic neuro-computational properties. But despite this similarity, there is also a
dissimilarity between the identity version and their view: They tend to think of phenomenal properties as
fixing a perception’s phenomenology, whereas the identity version—like any extension of neuro-
computational naive realism—insists that appearance properties are not enough to fix a perception’s
phenomenology.
31 Interestingly, the relational version is similar to Pautz’s (2017) suggestion that a subject’s neuro-
computational properties ground phenomenal representation relations that the subject bears to mind-
independent qualities. Note, however, that the relational version is not committed to the thought that
neuro-computationally grounded relations to mind independent qualities are phenomenal representation
relations.
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A possible concern for the relational version is its suggestion that your
appearance properties are both (1) necessitated by your intrinsic neuro-computa-
tional properties, and (2) non-perceptually relate you to mind independent
properties. This may sound odd. How can relations to properties be necessitated
by intrinsic properties? Though an interesting question, I am not sure that it should
lead us away from the relational version. This is because relations to many
properties are necessitated by intrinsic properties. For example, your height is an
intrinsic property, yet it necessitates you to stand in certain relations to other height
properties (e.g., having a height greater than an inch). Similarly, your mass is an
intrinsic property, yet it necessitates you to stand in certain extrinsic relations to
other mass properties (e.g., being more massive than a gram). Granted, such
examples fall short of a full explication of the relationship between neuro-
computational properties and relational appearance properties. Nonetheless, the
examples do show that this relationship is both coherent and worthy of further study.
In sum, both the identity version and the relational version are interesting views
deserving of attention. The identity version offers an appealing physicalist reduction
of appearance properties, while abandoning (Inheritance). The relational version is
compatible with (Inheritance), but it is less clear whether it allows appearance
properties to be reduced to physical ones. Furthermore, the relational version
interestingly suggests that appearance properties involve non-perceptual relations to
mind independent qualities.
I will not try to decide between the identity version and the relational version
here. My goal in this paper is to propose neuro-computational naive realism as an
attractive version of naive realism. I have done so by showing that neuro-
computational naive realism accommodates both the internal-dependence and
external-directedness of perceptions.
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